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INTRODUCTION
Geneva, May 12, 1975-The third
session of the 3rd United Nations
Sea Law Conference ended May 9
after the Third World and other
small and medium-sized countries
waged a fierce struggle against the
maritime hegemonism of the two
superpowers and again forced
them into a passive and isolated
position. 1
Viewed through the People's Republic of China's prism of a bipolar world,
the Sea Law Conferences held at Caracas and Geneva were victories. China
and the "oppressed nations" had stood
united to thwart the ambitions of the
superpowers who were portrayed as
completely to blame for the failure to
reach an agreement. It was the super-

powers who wanted to ..... maintain
their positions of hegemonism and who
assiduously cling to the outdated legal
regime of the seas and refuse to abandon their control and monopoly over
the seas and oceans. ,,2
Despite repeated Chinese protestations to the contrary, however, an
examination of a number of key criteria
would suggest that maritime strength of
the PRC may stand closer to the ranks
of the superpowers she is wont to attack
than to the developing nations she
claims to support.
According to Jane's Fighting Ships,
and The Military Balance, 1974-1975,
published by the International Institute
for Strategic Studies in London, for
example, Peking's navy has more than
tripled in size since the early sixties,
with submarine and naval aircraft forces
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ranking third in the world. Her coastal
defense fleet of fast missile, torpedo,
and gun boats is considerably larger
than that of the Soviet Union or the
United States. 3
Although the PRC's navy is primarily
designed for coastal defense, China's
emerging ability and readiness to conduct amphibious operations were dramatically demonstrated in her recent
seizure of the Paracel Islands in the
South China Sea-an operation that
avoided confrontation with the superpowers but nonetheless suggests that
China may be more capable today of
backing up her strong words about
sovereignty and jurisdiction than was
the case in the 1950's and early sixties
when the U.S. Navy continued to ply
the waters between Taiwan and the
mainland despite more than 200 "serious warnings" from Peking. 4
China's rlShing industry also borders
on the superpower range. The major
part of her effort is inland, but even
discounting their fresh-water catch, the
PRC is fourth among the world's ocean
fishing nations and conducts fishing
operations in 9 of the 19 major world
fishing areas dermed by the United
Nations Food and Agriculture Organization. s
China's salt-water fishing fleet has
been progressively motorized with
modern vessels equipped with telecommunications equipment, fish shoal
detectors, and storage facilities, all of
which has enabled most fishing villages
to report increases in each subsequent
annual catch. 6
Crude oil output, a significant factor
in determining potential as well as
actual power, was more than six times
greater in 1974 than in 1965, permitting
the PRC not only to meet its domestic
needs but allowing for an exportable
surplus. 7 According to Western oil
specialists, China is on the verge of
becoming one of the world's biggest oil
producers and exporters. 8 The shallow
floor of the Continental Shelf off the

coast of China, extending from the
Yellow Sea through the Paracel and
Spratly Islands in the South China Sea,
is considered one of the most geologically promising of the yet largely unexploited offshore areas. 9 Indeed, in
December 1974, the maiden voyage of
China's first domestically designed and
built drilling vessel, the Kantan (Prospector) was not only successful in striking oil, but also provided training for a
technical force and experience in marine
geological prospecting: 10
Keeping within the basic principle of
"maintaining independence and keeping
the initiative in our own hands and
relying on our own efforts, " I I China's
trade with the outside world has increased 5.66 percent since 1952. The
PRC has trade relations with more than
150 countries and trade agreements
with more than 50 other nations. 12
According to Lloyd's list of qualifying
flag states, China ranks 23rd in the
world in shipping tonnage,13 with estimates ranging from Lloyd's official 1.5
million, to Hong Kong shippers determination of about 4 million tons. 14
In terms of growth, although the
Hutung Shipyard in Shanghai boasts of
setting new records in 1973 with a total
outPut value of 2~ times that of 1965,
China still relies on foreign acquisitions
in the building of her merchant fleet.
Japan and Great Britain currently dominate the Chinese market for transport
and communications equipment, followed by Holland and the United
States. In 1974 orders were placed for
70 cargo ships, including freezer and
refrigerator vessels, with Japan and a
number of Western European countries
as the principal contractors. 15 It is also
claimed in Hong Kong that Peking is the
biggest ship charterer on the London
market. 16
In anticipation of an increase of
international trade, the Chinese have
expanded and modernized ,the port of
Shanghai and have improved harbor
facilities in nine major ports along
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China's coast, from Laien in the northeast to Chanchiang in the south. 1 7
It would appear then that, judging
from actual and potential maritime
strength, China's interests at Caracas
and Geneva should have been consistent
with, if not parallel to, those of the
United States, the Soviet Union, and
other seapowers. Yet the PRC's position
at these meetings was in support of the
most radical opponents of the maritime
nations-those who called for a new
regime which would severely restrict the
freedom of navigation for warships and
for some commercial vessels, limit the
scope of operations for the major fishing nations, and hobble exploitation of
the mineral resources of the deep seabed.
CARACAS-1974
In 1958 the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea convened
in Geneva. In the same year, the
People's Republic of China, a member
of neither the United Nations nor the
Law of the Sea Conference, issued its
own "Declaration on China's Territorial
Sea." It established a 12 nautical mile
limit, which it defended against American and British criticism as being a
sovereign right, consistent with economic and defense needs. Further, it
decreed that all vessels must observe the
relevant laws and regulations laid down
by the PRC and that no foreign warship
might enter China's territorial waters
without prior permission. 1S
These restrictions contrary to the
convention produced at Geneva, were
aimed primarily at the activities of the
U.S. 7th Fleet operating in waters
around Taiwan. 1 9
In addition, the Chinese applied the
straight baseline method of measuring
the breadth of their territorial waters, a
method authorized by international
agreements for countries such as Norway, with large stretches of indented
coastline. The result of using this mea-

suring system was to convert the
Chiunghow Strait and Pohai Bay,
normally within China's territorial sea,
into internal waters, precluding the
rights of innocent passage for foreign
vessels. 2o
By the end of 1971, however,
China's isolation fro~ the world community was over, and her security concerns now encompassed not only the
U.S. 7th Fleet but the increased activity
of a growing Soviet Navy in Asian
waters.
Territorial Sea. By the time the
second session of the Third United
Nations Conference on Law of the Sea
convened in Caracas, Venezuela, the
issue of conversion from a 3-mile to a
12-mile territorial sea was all but passe.
Most participants, including the United
States, had reached a consensus on
including the 12-mile limit in an international convention. The PRC, however,
virtually ignored the question of the 12
miles" and, along with their Albanian
sp 0 kesman, 2 1 addressed themselves
only to limits placed on the 200·mile
economic zone. China constantly repeated its position that a nation had the
sovereign right to determine the extent
of its territorial sea.
In his opening remarks to the conference, Chia Shu-fan, leader of the
Chinese delegation and Vice Minister of
Foreign Trade, stated:
We hold that to define the territorial sea and scope of national
jurisdiction is the sovereign right
of each country and brooks no
dictation from one or two superpowers. Coastal states are entitled
to reasonably define their territorial sea of an appropriate
breadth and, beyond it, their exclusive economic or fishery zones
of appropriate limits in the light
of their specific natural conditions
and the needs of their national
economic development and national security.2 2
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Straits. The breadth of a nation's
territorial sea is particularly significant
because an extension from 3 to 12 miles
would overlap more than 100 straits
which had been considered part of the
high seas. 13 The United States, expressing the impact of this change on
most of the maritime nations, argued
that straits used for international navigation were connecting points for large
areas of the oceans and that unimpeded
transit through these straits fell under
the existing rights of the high seas
regime. 24
The PRe, on the other hand, defmed
a strait lying within a territorial sea as
an inseparable part of that territorial
sea, with the coastal state having full
authority to enact laws regulating
passage of commercial ships and aircraft
through and over these straits. A coastal
state could also require prior approval
for the passage of military vessels. 2 5
The principal thrust of China's stance
on innocent passage through straits
centered on the growing strength of the
Soviet Navy and the rivalry between the
United States and the U.S.S.R. for what
the PRe charged was "world hegemony." "For many years Soviet socialimperialism has regarded the straits of
other countries as a life line for its
aggression and expansion abroad and its
contention with the other superpower
for dominance over the sea as well as
the world," wrote a correspondent for
the New China News Agency. "It tries
by every means to secure unimpeded
passage for its warships and nuclear
submarines through the straits of other
countries in order to cruise at will in all
. the oceans, threatening the peace and
security of many countries.,,2 6 In doing
so, the Chinese further accused the
Soviets of "contempt" for the sovereign ty of other nations. 2 7
One example of such contempt, offered by the Chinese, was a SovietJapanese announcement in March 1972
that the two countries had come to an
"official understanding" on making the

Straits of Malacca an "international
strait" in spite of an agreement among
Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia in
November 1971 that a cooperative organization to safeguard the navigation in
the Malacca and Singapore straits should
be created and that "internationalization of the Straits of Malacca"z 8 was
unacceptable.
The Chinese also chided the Russians
for revisionist inconsistencies, citing
both a 1949 decision by the Soviet
Judge on the World Court affirming the
right of coastal states to formulate
regulations for navigation in their territorial straits and the refusal by the
Russians to allow free transit of foreign
icebreakers and frigates through their
own Vilkusky Strait. 2 9
The deputy leader of the Chinese
delegation, Ling Ching took further
issue with the "smokescreen" effort by
the superpowers to obliterate the distinction between commercial and warships by the use of the term "all ships."
He also pointed out that while freedom
of navigation through straits was ostensibly aimed at developing international
trade and that such trade was the
legitimate desire of the peoples of the
world, this could hardly be brought
about by the free passage through straits
of warships and nuclear submarines. 3 0
The Economic Zone. Both the Russians and Americans attempted to resolve the issue of a 12-mile territorial
sea and a 200-mile economic zone in an
"overall treaty package" which would
include, "provisions for unimpeded
transit of international straits, and a
balance between coastal state rights and
duties within the economic zone. ,,31
The PRe repudiated this "conditional
recognition" in exchange for free passage through sovereign straits of warships and submarines. 3 2
Fishing. Fishing rights in the economic zone brought the strongest challenge from the Chinese. Again the
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United States and the Soviet Union
presented similar plans which provided
the licensing and regulation of foreign
fishing fleets by an international authority where a coastal state was unable
to utilize fully its fishery resources in
the economic zone_
Almost predictably, the People's
Republic of China once again accused
the superpowers of knavery, in this case
of reintroducing the discredited concept
of preferential rights in the economic
zone at the expense of the sovereignty
of the smaller coastal states. In an
article in the Peking Review, the Chinese labeled the Soviet Union as a
"super-fishing despot" ·whose outer sea
and distant water catches, those in
Asian, African, and Latin American
waters, made up to three-quarters of her
total catch. The Chinese accused the
Russians of exhausting the fishery resources in these areas. 3 3
Ling, in addressing the conference on
this question, denounced the superpowers for paying only lipservice to the
concept of an economic zone but at the
same time denying the coastal states
their exclusive economic rights. "We are
of the opinion," he said, "that a coastal
state may, in accordance with its wish
and needs, allow foreign fishermen to
fish in the areas under its jurisdiction by
bilateral or regional agreements ... but
it must not be provided beforehand that
the coastal state shall have the obligation to grant foreign states any such
rights. ,,34
Scientific Research. Peking's commitment to exclusive jurisdiction clashed
once again with the American and Russian proposals in the area of scientific
research within an economic zone. The
United States argued that not only did
many developing countries lack the resources to conduct research, but that a
"consent regime" supported by China
and other developing nations would
increase costs and would undermine the
validity of scientific findings by virtue

of the fact that research teams could be
excluded from some areas of the oceans
by the coastal states. "Oceanic processes
do not respect man-made jurisdictional
boundaries," was the position of American Ambassador John Stevenson. 35
The United States then proceeded to
set forth proposals designed to protect
the rights of coastal states, including
advance notification of proposed research, the right of a coastal state to
participate, the sharing of data and
samples with the coastal state, assistance
in interpreting results, publication of
significant findings, compliance by researchers with international environmental standards, flag state certification
that the research will be purely scientific and conducted by a qualified institution, and respect for the jurisdiction
of the coastal state within its economic
zone. 36
The Chinese countered with an assertion that: " ... in the hands of the
superpowers, marine scientific research
is a tool of contending for maritime
hegemony and pushing policies of aggression and plunder.,,3 7 Four alternative principles guiding such research
were then offered by the PRe. They
included the prerequisite of prior consent; the right of the coastal state not
only to participate in research projects,
but the right of prior approval on the
publication or transfer of all data and
results; regulation of scientific research
in the international sea area by an
international regime; and assistance by
the sophisticated maritime community
to developing nations to enhance the
latter's capability to conduct research
independently.3 8
Pollution Control Once more, on the
matter of marine pollution prevention,
the effective difference between Peking
and developed maritime nations hinged
on the scope of a coastal zone's jurisdiction. The United States, concerned
that navigation over almost one-third of
the oceans' surface would be subjected
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to a multitude of conflicting rules,
proposed that standards for vesselsource pollution should be set internationally through the Inter-Governmental
Consultive Organization (IMCO), by flag
states for their own vessels, or by port
states for vessels using their ports_ 39
American delegates also tendered
proposals which would establish different environmental obligations for
developing and developedstates. 4o
The PRC response to these proposals,
as articulated by Lo Yu-ju, that "under
the pretext of 'international standards'
and 'global measures,' [the superpowers] attempt to deny the jurisdiction of coastal states and their role in
the prevention and control of marine
pollution." Lo conceded that measures
on an international or regional basis
were needed, but these measures can in
no way substitute for antipollution
regulations by coastal states. He also
alluded to the proposed "double standard" of environmental control by
stating that "global measures" would
restrict the economic and industrial
development of the developing countries.,,41
The Deep Seabed. The issue of the
regime and the machinery governing the
international seabed area was particularly contentious, widening the gulf
between the advanced nations and the
Third World, with the People's Republic
of China vociferously in the latter camp.
The conflict revolved around the questions of who shall exploit the resources
in the area, and what shall be the
structure, powers, and functions of the
international machinery.
The United States took the position
that access to the rich manganese
nodules in the deep seabed be guaranteed on a nondiscriminatory basis,
under reasonable conditions which
would provide the security needed to
attract the private investments essential
for development. A portion of the
revenues earned from this exploitation

would be used for international community purposes, particularly for developing countries.
The United States, supported by
eight Western Europe countries and
Japan, favored development through a
system of licensing to private investors
having the requisite scientific capability.
Control, rather than regulation, as
proposed by the opponents to the U.S.
plan, would rest with an international
authority with policy guidance coming
from a broadly representative assembly
but with decisionmaking authority in
the hands of a smaller executive
body.42
Over 100 nations, including the
People's Republic of China, supported a
counterplan submitted by the Third
World's Group of 77. Under this proposal, all rights to the deep seabed
would be vested in an international
authority "on behalf of mankind as a
whole." The international authority
would be entitled to exploit the deep
seabed resources directly, through contracts, joint ventures, and other forms
of associations, with complete and effective control in the hands of the
authority.43
Ke Tsai-shue, speaking for the PRC,
further stated that pending the establishment of an international regime and
machinery, no state or person should be
allowed to exploit the deep seabed and
that all such activities already underway
should be stopped. 4 4
Ke and others extended the scope of
the debate on the deep sea area by
citing relevant United Nations General
Assembly resolutions calling for peaceful uses of the deep seabed. "Therefore," said Ke, "we must oppose the
superpowers conducting military operations in the area under whatever cover.
The emplacement of nuclear weapons as
well as activities of nuclear submarines
in the area shall be prohibited. Scientific
research and other related activities ... shall also be subjected to
appropriate regulation. We are opposed
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to military espionage carried out under
cover of scientific research.,,4 5
The American delegation came to
Caracas hopeful that at least the political substance, if not the technical details
of a treaty, could be hammered out. As
it was,'however, Ambassador Stevenson
could only take heart from the fact that
most countries wanted to conclude a
treaty. He saw hope in the fact that
traditional regional and political alignments of states were gradually being
replaced by informal groups whose
memberships were based on issues and
that the number and tempo of private
meetings, essential to any real bargaining, had increased considerably. Some
of the participants had moved beyond
their previous formal positions at these
unpublicized meetings. Most important,
according to Stevenson, was the organization in each committee of comprehensive sets of working papers, making it
clear what the structure -and general
content ofthe treaty will be.
"What was missing in Caracas," said
Stevenson, "was sufficient political will
to make hard negotiating choices ... we
must now move from the technical
drafting and preliminary exploratory
exchanges of views ... to the highest
political levels, involving heads of states
themselves, to make accommodations
on these critical issues possible."
A general declaration of agreement
on such specific issues as the 12-mile
territorial sea and the 200-mile economic zone could have been achieved at
Caracas, but the United States opposed
piecemeal decisions which did not spell
out key details. American support for
the 12-mile territorial sea and the
200-mile economic zone was conditioned on the satisfactory resolutions of
such issues as the unimpeded passage of
straits and the rights and responsibilities
of coastal states in these areas. 4 6
The single package concept was
opposed by the People's Republic of
China. Less concerned than the United
States over a successful conclusion at

Caracas, the PRC chose to view tradeoffs and compromises as superpower
tactics designed to divide the Third
World and to erode the sovereignty and
jurisdictional rights of coastal states.
GENEVA-1975

The third session of the Law of the
Sea Conference opened in Geneva,
Switzerland, on 18 March 1975. There
were few formal speeches-this was a
negotiating session where the general
outlines developed at Caracas were to be
expanded into a new treaty on law of
the sea. Despite serious bargaining
efforts, however, the delegates were
unable to conclude a convention acceptable for signature. The only important
document to emerge from the session
was a single text on virtually all LOS
topics prepared by the chairman of each
of the three committees. This was not a
negotiated text, but represented, in the
view of each chairman, the prevailing
sentiments on the various issues, leaving
out extreme positions. For the U.S.
delegation, this procedure is viewed as a
positive procedural accomplishment
which should make it easier to negotiate
an agreement at the next session of the
LOS conference scheduled for the
spring of 1976.47
Although there were few substantive
changes in the positions taken by the
People's Republic of China, the United
States, or the Soviet Union, Geneva did
expose much of China's hollow rhetoric
regarding the single-mindedness of the
Third World's opposition to the superpowers. Self-interest, disinterest, or
trade-off possibilities were as much
motivating factors behind national positions as was identification with a regional or developing group. The PRC's
apparent major interest-use of the LOS
conference as a platform for attacks on
the Soviet Union and the United States
-required little shifting from her previous support for the more radical proposals made at Caracas.
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Territorial Sea. The single text
emanating out of the second committee
reflected consensus for a 12-mile territorial sea. China did not comment on
article 7 of this text which states:
"Where the establishment of a straight
baseline ... has the effect of enclosing
as internal waters areas which previously
had been considered as part of the
territorial sea, of the exclusive zone or
of the high seas, a right of innocent
passage ... shall exist in these
waters. ,,48 As cited earlier, China's
adoption of the straight baseline
method in 1958 removed the right of
innocent passage from the Chiunghow
Strait and Pohai Bay, both formerly
within China's territorial waters, but
now considered internal waters. 49
Peking did comment, however, on
Ecuador and Peru's insistence that they
had the right to extend their territorial
waters up to 200 miles. While still
maintaining their insistence on the
sovereign right of nations to set their
own territorial sea limits, the 200-mile
claim found so little support at Geneva
from other nations that the Chinese
used obfuscating language when they
spoke of "resolutely" supporting the
struggle of Third World countries to
safeguard their national resources,
economy, and sovereignty. They then
substituted the term "200 mile maritime right" in place of territorial sea and
proceeded to describe, not the territorial sea, but the economic zone. 5 0
Other provisions for the territorial
sea found in the single text evinced no
special response from the Chinese
despite the fact that they ran counter to
the positions normally taken by the
PRe. These single text provisions included: no restrictions against the surface navigation of submarines through
territorial waters; no coastal state restrictions on the design, construction,
manning or equipment of foreign ships
transiting territorial waters; the same
righ t of innocent passage for warships as
for commercial vessels; and limitations

on the criminal jurisdiction of coastal
states to foreign ships passing through
territorial waters. 5 1
Straits_ The American delegation saw
increasing support at Geneva for its
position stressing the necessity of guaranteed transit for all ships and aircraft
through straits used for international
navigation. 5 2 The Chinese held to their
previous position that: "a strait within
the limits of a territorial sea, no matter
whether it is frequently used for international navigation, constitutes an inseparable, component part of the territorial sea of a coastal state." They
argued that innocent passage through
such a strait should not apply to foreign
warships. 5 3
What the PRe refused to recognize
was that many nonstrait states simply
were not concerned about innocent
passage of warships or the exercise of
coastal state sovereignty and jurisdiction
in these areas except as restrictions on
free navigation of straits might affect
the prices of imports and exports. Other
nonstrait states, while unwilling to be
placed on record, recognized that their
own security depended on the right of
free transit for either the Soviet or
American navies. 5 4
Probably the greatest consideration
that divided the developing world on
the straits issue was an appreciation by
some nations that they could use free
passage through straits as a bargaining
lever with the superpowers for tradeoffs on other law of the sea issues. 5 5 It
was on this willingness to compromise
that the PRe found itself out of step
with many of the members of the Third
World.
Economic Zone. Treatment of the
economic zone in the single text appears
to be more in line with the positions
supported by the People's Republic of
China than with those of the United
States or the Soviet Union. However,
U.S. Ambassador Stevenson held a more
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sanguine view of the text, asserting that
to a large degree it did establish a
balance between the rights and duties of
coastal states and other states having
vital interests in these areas. 5 6
Contrary to the previously held
American position, the term "exclusive"
is applied to the economic zone in the
title and throughout the second committee report. Sovereign and jurisdictional rights to exploration, exploitation, and scientific research within the
zone are granted to the coastal state.
There are passages, however, which mitigate the impact of coastal state control.
For example, the PRC made much in
Geneva of the Soviet insistence that the
exercise of coastal state rights in the
economic zone give due regard to other
legitimate uses of the high seas. The
Chinese argued that inclusion of high
seas rights distorts the status and nature
of the economic zone, charging the
Soviets with wanting to threaten the
sovereignty and security of these coastal
states. 57
Article 47 of the single text provides,
however, that high seas rights of navigation and overflight shall apply to the
exclusive economic zone as long as the
exercise of these rights is not incompatible with the provisions outlined
in the section on the economic zone. 5 8
The article also protects the right of
foreign nations to lay cables and submarine pipelines in the 200-mile economic zone of another coastal state. 5 9
In conformity with overwhelming sentiment in favor of freedom of navigation
and the laying of cables and pipelines,
the PRC conceded this point in the last
days at Geneva. 60
Fishing_ On fishing rights in the
economic zone, the single text attempts
to strike a middle ground between the
position of complete sovereignty of
coastal states over fishing resources, a
stance supported by the PRC, and the
"preferential rights" proposal of the
United States and the Soviet Union. The

text provides for the coastal states, not
an international authority, to determine
the allowable catch of living resources in
the exclusive economic zone, but also
provides that, "where the coastal state
does not have the capacity to harvest
the entire allowable catch, it shall,
through agreements, give other states
access to the surplus of the allowable
catch.,,61 The PRC contribution to the
debate was limited to a continuation of
her attacks on the Soviet Union as a
pillager of the fishery resources of
others. 62
Landlocked Nations_ Throughout the
Caracas conference and again at Geneva,
Chinese accounts of the proceedings
contained oblique remarks about superpower efforts at dividing the unanimity
of the developing world. These comments referred to a continuing dispute
within the Group of 77 over access to
the resources in the economic zone for
landlocked and geographically disadvantaged states. The single text article
on this issue provides for participation
of noncoastal states in the exploitation
of "living resources" in the economic
zone of a neighboring coastal state but
leaves the terms and conditions of such
participation to subsequent bilateral or
regional agreements. 6 3 The Chinese
wholly subscribe to this position. The
landlocked states supported by the
United States, do not, however, feel
that the interests of these geographically
disadvantaged countries have been adequately protected. 64
Missing from the single text provision, for example, as well as from PRC
and other coastal state commentaries,
are any references to the sharing of
"nonliving" or mineral resources in the
economic zone_ Most of the coastal
developing countries completely rejected the demands of their landlocked
neighbors for a share of mineral resources, and the Latin American coastal
states were not even willing to share
access to fishery resources. 65
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Scientific Research. The dispute over
the requirement of prior consent by the
coastal state for scientific research in its
economic zone continued at Geneva
The Soviet Union modified its position
by proposing that only fundamental
scientific research unrelated to exploration and exploitation of resources be
exempt from prior notification. The
PRC refused to accept this distinction,
arguing again that any deviation from
the principle of prior notification nullified the jurisdictic)n of the coastal state
and gave the superpowers "a free hand
to carry out all furtive activities under
the pretext of scientific research... 6 6
The third committee dealt directly
with the issue of scientific research,
apart from concern over rights in the
economic zone, and made a sharp
distinction between research related to
the exploration and exploitation of
living and nonliving resources, for which
prior consent is mandatory, and pure
scientific research. For the latter purpose, notification is required only in
order to give the coastal state an opportunity to participate in the research
project. The coastal state cannot prevent pure research unless it determines
that the project is not, in its estimation,
fundamental in nature. In such instances, the dispute can be submitted to
settlement machinery. 67
The Deep Seabed. As in Caracas, no
compromise could be found in Geneva
for the issue of control over the exploitation of the deep seabed. The single
text coming out of the first committee
fairly well encompassed the proposals of
the Group of 77, providing for an
international authority to explore and
exploit the deep seabed directly and for
control over the authority to be, in
effect, in the hands of the majority of
smaller nations. These proposals were
opposed by the United States and other
technologically advanced nations but
supported by the PRC.
Ambassador Stevenson, in a final

statement at Geneva, expressed the
American delegation's dissatisfaction
with the apparent trend on a seabed
protocol when he said:
The investment in this type of
project is, as you know, an enormous one. And, in a world where
we have all felt the effects not
only of scarcity of vital raw
materials, but of uncertainty of
access to them, nations are not
prepared, in my judgement, to
subject their access to seabed
minerals to a system of exploration and exploitation and to a
decision-making process in which
they do not have reasonable assurances of security of access and
may not be adequately represented. Moreover, I do not think
it will be possible, seen against the
background of today's developments in raw material matters, to
agree to give ultimate powers of
exclusive exploitation to a single,
new international entity ... 68
The inability of the Geneva conference to meet its previously assigned
deadline for a completed convention
seemed to affirm the skepticism of some
observers that no conference involving
more than 140 countries and over 97
different issues could ever conclude a
single treaty acceptable to a majority of
delegations. 69 The major stumbling
block to an overall consensus was the
issue of deep seabed exploitation. The
impact of the oil cartel on Western
economies and on the world's political
balance was apparent to the developing
countries. They were, therefore, acutely
conscious of the importance of controlling the untapped mineral wealth of
the seas. For many of these countries,
including the People's Republic of
China, Third World domination of the
deep seabed was crucial if they were to
create what, in their eyes, would be a
new, more equitable, world economic
order.
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Nevertheless, the American delegation was still hopeful that a more
favorable accord could be reached at the
1976 continuation of the Law of the
Sea Conference_ The United States may
resubmit, in a revised form, a compromise proposal that would divide the
deep seabed into areas-some reserved
for direct exploitation by the international authority and others to be
worked through licensed companies.
Even though a similar American proposal was rejected at Geneva by the
Group of 77, the United States believes
that agreement is so close on other
issues that a breakthrough on the deep
seabed impasse could result in a comprehensive treaty. 70
On the other hand, the People's
Republic of China expressed no similar
optimism or concern for a successful
conclusion. The closed negotiating
atmosphere at Geneva denied them the
wide propaganda platform they enjoyed
in Caracas, and consequently, on many
of the law of the sea issues debated at
Geneva, the Chinese were silent. The
issues on which they chose to comment
were those that afforded an opportunity
to demonstrate solidarity with the Third
World in opposition to the superpowers
and to repeat their litany of invectives
against the Soviet Union.

CONCLUSION
The contributions of the People's
Republic of China at Caracas and
Geneva were neither creative nor constructive. Her positions were often extreme, and despite frequent assertions
about solidarity with the Third World, it
is the opinion of some members of the
U.S. delegation that China's bellicose
rhetoric had little impact, except on the
radical minority of the developing
world.
Indeed, one member of the U.S.
delegation feels that the PRC was not
interested one way or another in the
outcome of Geneva and may not even

become a party to a treaty should one
eventually evolve. 71
Dr. Tao-tai Hsia, Chief of the Far
Eastern Law Division of the Library of
Congress, maintains that China does not
want to be shackled by legal norms such
as treaties, and even in their formal
speeches, the PRC delegates were very
careful to keep their own options
open. 72
Peking recognized that these conferences, as have most international
gatherings in recent years, pitted the
newly arrived against the powerful and
established. Exhibiting little respect for
tradition, for the rules of the past;
resentful of the leadership positions of
the superpowers; cognizant of their
group strength in an international
forum; taking at face value the Westernsponsored concept of sovereign
equality; and caught up in an irresistible
momentum for change; the Third World
was determined to rewrite the rules
governing the use of the seas. China
made much of this undercurrent to pose
as the apostle of progress in opposition
to superpower machinations designed to
maintain the status quo.
Even before the second session at
Caracas came to grips with substantive
matters, the United States and the
Soviet Union were cast in the roles of
selfish obstructionists by the PRC. The
Chinese accused the Soviets of being in
concert with the Americans to "obtain
the right of veto in a disguised form."
The issue was one of reaching agreement
on major topics through "consensus,"
which was characterized by the Chinese
as a ploy by which the superpowers
hoped to block the will of the majority
and thereby "maintaih their interests as
hegemonic powers.,,7 3
By virtue of her naval strength, her
ranking among the leading fishing
nations, her potential as one of the
foremost oil producers and exporters,
her rapid growth as a shipping and
trading nation, and her position as a
permanent member of the United
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Nations Security Council, the People's
Republic of China should qualify, at
least, for potential status as a superpower, seeking the same prerogatives
and advantages as the United States and
the U.S.S.R. Instead, the PRC has
vehemently declared that "China is one
of the countries of the third world
... China will never be a superpower ... ,,74 Even the new "Constitution of the People's Republic of China"
proclaims, "In international affairs, we
should uphold proletarian internationalism. China will never be a superpower.,,75
Apart from the PRC's obvious desire
to ally with and eventually lead the
majority of states lumped together in
the Third World, these protestations
against superpower status can also be
explained in the way China perceives its
strengths and interests vis·a-vis her two
major rivals, the Soviet Union and the
United States.
The PRC may be a principal naval
power in her part of the world, but she
does not consider herself as having
worldwide naval ambitions. Capt. John
R. Dewenter, USN, writing in the May
1975 issue of the United States Naval
Institute Proceedings, states that in
about 5 years the PRC will have saturated the Yellow Sea with about a
hundred submarines, a thousand coastal
defense craft, and a large number of
aircraft. He speculates that their objective is the complete control of the
adjacent seas rather than the embarkation into distant deepwater ventures. 7 6
China does not consider herself as number three in naval power to the United
States and U.S.S.R., but as a smaller and
weaker state. 77
In addition, she considers herself as a
strait state, with concerns over Soviet
and American encroachment in the
passages between the Hainan Islands and
the mainland and through the Formosa
Straits and Islands. 78
Although the Chinese are fourth in
the world in tons of saltwater fishing

catches and are fishing in 9 of the
world's 19 major fishing zones, the great
bulk of their saltwater catch is taken
out of the Northwest Pacific zone,
offshore of the Chinese mainland. Even
in this area, the PRC trails behind
Japan, the Soviet Union, and the Republic of Korea. 79 Compared to Japan,
the Soviets, and the United States,
China is not equipped for large-scale,
long-distance fishing expeditions. She
lacks technology, exploratory fishing
vessels, and the requisite number of
factory ships.
The PRC is also moving very slowly
in her oil exploitation. She still relies
greatly on coal and wood for fuel and
appears not eager to jump into the
world market as a major oil exporter.
Rather than tum to more developed oil
producing countries for the technology
necessary to exploit its resources fully,
China rejects joint ventures and relies on
its own expertise. 8 0
Captain Dewenter contends that
China is "stringently husbanding" its oil
resources in recognition of its potential
as a source of foreign exchange to
finance imports necessary for the systematic development of its industries.
China is also aware of the political
importance of oil in a world of increasing need and decreasing supply. 8 1
While her merchant marine grows,
her port facilities expand, her trade and
trade agreements for foreign countries
increase, China, for her size and potential, is still a minor commercial nation
on the international scene. Once again,
this is partly by design. An article in
Jen-min Jib-pao explains the principles
governing China's foreign trade:
... the state must be in control of
it and the condition of dependence on or control of it by foreign
powers must be thoroughly demolished. While mainly relying on
her own manpower, material and
wealth, and trying to increase her
exports, the country may import
a certain amount of materials for
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construction and consumer goods
according to the needs and possibili ties_ In no circumstances
should a country rely on imports
to meet the needs of national
construction and daily necessities
... We hold that political independence cannot be separated
from economic independence ... 82
China exports an insignificant proportion of its national product, but even
that is done mainly for the purpose of
raising the foreign exchange required to
import goods and equipment to supplement the general development strategy
of self-reliance. 8 3
On the evidence, therefore, China is
not yet a superpower in a class with the
Soviet Union and the United States, but
neither is she a part of the relatively
impotent developing countries in whose
interests China purportedly spoke.
Peking skirted this dichotomy during
the Caracas and Geneva negotiations by
constant and repetitious attacks on the
superpowers to emphasize her support
for the Third World. At the same time,
she never fully committed herslef so as
to allow flexibility of position. 84 Flexibility through the lack of international
constraints may be viewed by Peking as
preferable to a law of the sea regime,
which, on the surface, might appear to
be more advantageous. For example, a
200-mile exclusive economic zone,
which the Chinese have supported,
could serve to exclude the Japanese
fishing fleet from most of the Yellow
Sea and parts of the East China Sea. 8 5
This would leave the Koreas and Taiwan
as contenders with China for the fishery
resources in that area. Would the exclusion of Japan be in China's best
interest: For 20 years both nations have
peacefully worked these waters under
provIsIons of a nongovernmental
fisheries arrangement and are currently
negotiating a new agreement at a governmental level. 8 6 In spite of the fact
that at Caracas and Geneva, Japan was

the most implacable foe of the 200-mile
exclusive economic zone, reflecting her
worldwide fishing interests, the Chinese
never singled out Japan, as they did the
Soviet Union, for attack as a selfish
exploiter of these resources.
A 200-mile exclusive economic zone,
together with recognition of a coastal
state's jurisdiction over that portion of
the Continental Shelf that extends
beyond the 200 miles, could also be to
China's advantage. The shallow waters
of her contiguous seas provide her with
a Continental Shelf as far as the Okinawa Trough. Taken together with her
claim to ownership of the SenkakuTiasyut'ai Islands (contended by
Japan), 8 7 the PRC, under a new law of
the sea mandate, effectively could control much of the potentially oil-rich
areas under her adjacent seas. These are
areas presently being mapped for exploitation by Japan and South Korea,
under strong Chinese protest. 8 8
While supporting the 200-mile exclusive economic zone, the Chinese were
unwilling to compromise on the issues
of straits, fisheries, and scientific research within the zone. China also supported the principle of coastal state
jurisdiction over the extended Continental Shelf, but opposed the American
proposal that profits extracted from this
area be shared internationally. If the
People's Republic of China truly wanted
a convention that would legalize the
200-mile economic zone, she might have
played the "trade-off" game as did most
of the delegate nations. That she did not
choose to compromise, even on issues of
peripheral concern to her, such as pollution, suggests that China does not view a
definitive treaty on law of the sea as
being consistent with her interests or
modus operandi.
Much of East Asia is either under
Communist rule or is intimidated by the
fear of an extending Communist influence. Within this geographic area and in
such an atmosphere, the People's
Republic of China must feel a sense of
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ascendancy. It would appear, therefore,
that whatever arrangements are to be
made on fishing rights and oil exploitation, the PRC would rather have control
over its bargaining prerogatives than be
confined by provisions of an international convention.
Finally, the PRC's performance at
the Caracas and Geneva conferences
demonstrates the profound impact of
tradition, history, and Marxism on
modern China's attitude toward international relations.
The ruling principle of order in dynastic China was the Sinocentric ideology of
the Heavenly Mandate, a concept which
recognized no equals to the Emperor.
That being the case, there existed no basis
for international relations that were understood to be agreements among equals.
Foreign policy, such as it was, revolved
around ritual and tribute. 39
China's early experience with rules of
international conduct imposed by the
.west left an additional legacy of suspicion and cynicism. One of China's
early diplomats wrote in 1891: "International law is just like Chinese statutory law-reasonable but unreliable. If
there is right without might, right will
not prevail. ,,9 0
From 1949, when the Communists
assumed power, to 1971, when they
were admitted into the United Nations,
the PRC was in virtual isolation from
most international forums. In this
period, Chinese scholars began to examine international law in the context
of Marxist-Leninist doctrine. Starting
with the assumption that existing international law was designed by Western
nations to sanctify their encroachments
upon non-Western people, Chinese legal
scholar Chu Li-ju wrote:
International law is an instrument
for settling international problems. If this instrument is useful
to our country, to the socialist
cause, or to the cause of peace for
peoples of the world, we will use
it. But if it is disadvantageous

... we will not use it, and we
should create a new instrument to
replace it. 9 1
It is worth noting that the Chinese
word for international law is Cheng-fa,
literally translated as "politics-Iaw.,,9 2
Another Sino-Marxist concept holds
that the ultimate objective of international relations is not designed to achieve
stability, a position underlying most
Western diplomacy, but continuous friction as represented in the class struggle
and permanent revolution. 93
Prime Minister Chou En-lai, in a
speech delivered at the 4th National
People's Congress, characterized the
present international situation as "great
disorder under heaven. " The Peking
pUblication Jen-min Jib-pao picked up
this phrase when it wrote:
The international situation
marked by great disorder under
heaven is a good thing. It has
upset the old world order, imperialism and colonialism, and
especially the formations of the
two superpowers. It has aroused
the people of various countries
and enabled them to get steeled
through struggle and march forward with big strides. 94
There is some doubt that the differences that separated the various
nations at Caracas and Geneva can be
compromised sufficiently at the next
scheduled session of the law of the sea
conference in April 1976. It is doubtful
too that should a document emerge, the
People's Republic of China would
become a signatory. As long as some of
the nations of the world observe the old
regime of the seas, the PRC can retain
its flexibility by continuing to reject
principles of international law to which,
she may argue, she is not a party. And
as long as other nations of the world
contribute to a growing anarchy of the
seas through unilateral deviations from
accepted international legal norms, the
Chinese can continue to exult in "great
disorder under heaven. "
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